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Abstract— A generalized multiple access channel (GMAC) with
one confidential message set is studied, where two users (users 1
and 2) attempt to transmit common information to a destination,
and user 1 also has confidential information intended for the
destination. Moreover, user 1 wishes to keep its confidential
information as secret as possible from user 2. A deterministic
GMAC is first studied, and the capacity-equivocation region and
the secrecy capacity region are obtained. Two main classes of the
GMAC are then studied: the binary GMAC and the Gaussian
GMAC. For both channels, the capacity-equivocation region and
the secrecy capacity region are established.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important security issue in multi-terminal networks
is the transmission of confidential information to legitimate
destinations while keeping other nodes as ignorant of this
information as possible. The secrecy level of a confiden-
tial message at a nonlegitimate node (or a wire-tapper) is
measured by the equivocation rate, i.e., the entropy rate of
the confidential message conditioned on the channel outputs
at this node. The secrecy capacity is the maximum rate at
which the confidential message can be reliably transmitted
to the intended destination with the wire-tapper obtaining no
information.
The secrecy capacity was established for a basic wire-tap
channel by Wyner in [1], and for a more general model of the
broadcast channel with confidential messages by Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner in [2]. The relay channel with confidential messages
was studied in [3], where the secrecy rate was given. More
recently, a generalized multiple access channel (GMAC) with
confidential messages was studied in [4], where each user
wishes to transmit a confidential message to a destination, and
wishes to keep the other user as ignorant of its confidential
message as possible. The secrecy rate region was given for the
GMAC with two confidential message sets, and the secrecy
capacity region was established for the GMAC with one con-
fidential message set. Other work on multiple access channels
with confidential messages can be found in [5], [6].
In this paper, we focus on the GMAC with one confidential
message set, where the two users have a common message for
the destination and only one user (user 1) has a confidential
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message for the destination. We first study a simple determin-
istic GMAC, and characterize the capacity-equivocation region
and the secrecy capacity region. The focus of this paper is on
the two main classes of GMACs: the binary GMAC and the
Gaussian GMAC. For both channels, we establish the capacity-
equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region explicitly.
In this paper, we use xn to indicate the vector (x1, . . . , xn),
and use xni to indicate the vector (xi, . . . , xn). Throughout the
paper, the logarithmic function is to the base 2.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section
II, we introduce the channel model of the GMAC with one
confidential message set. In Section III, we present the secrecy
capacity region of a simple deterministic GMAC with one
confidential message set. In Section IV, we present the secrecy
capacity region for a binary GMAC model with one confi-
dential message set. In Section V, we focus on the Gaussian
GMAC with one confidential message set, and present our
results on the secrecy capacity region.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND PREVIOUS RESULTS
In this section, we first define the GMAC with one confi-
dential message set, and then review the known results for this
model.
Definition 1: A discrete memoryless GMAC consists of
two finite channel input alphabets X1 and X2, two finite
channel output alphabets Y and Y2, and a transition probability
distribution p(y, y2|x1, x2) (see Fig. 1), where x1 ∈ X1 and
x2 ∈ X2 are channel inputs from users 1 and 2, respectively,
and y ∈ Y and y2 ∈ Y2 are channel outputs at the destination
and user 2, respectively.
Definition 2: The GMAC with one confidential message set
is physically degraded if the transition probability distribution
satisfies
p(y, y2|x1, x2) = p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2), (1)
i.e., y2 is independent of x1 conditioned on y and x2.
Definition 3: A (2nR0 , 2nR1 , n) code consists of the fol-
lowing:
• Two message sets: W0 = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR0} and W1 =
{1, 2, . . . , 2nR1}. The messages W0 and W1 are inde-
pendent and uniformly distributed over W0 and W2,
respectively.
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Fig. 1. GMAC with one confidential message set
• Two (stochastic) encoders, one at user 1: W0 ×W1 →
Xn1 , which maps each message pair (w0, w1) ∈ W0×W1
to a codeword xn1 ∈ Xn1 ; the other at user 2: W0 → Xn2 ,
which maps each message w0 ∈ W0 to a codeword xn2 ∈
Xn2 ;
• One decoder at the destination: Yn → W0 × W1,
which maps a received sequence yn to a message pair
(w0, w1) ∈ W0 ×W1.
Note that although user 2 can receive channel outputs (see
Fig. 1), it is only a passive listener in that its encoding function
is not affected by the received outputs. However, since its
outputs contain the confidential message W1 sent by user 1, it
may extract W1 from its outputs. We assume that user 1 treats
user 2 as a wire-tapper, and wishes to keep it as ignorant of
W1 as possible. The secrecy level of W1 at user 2 is measured
by the following equivocation rate:
1
n
H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0). (2)
The larger the equivocation rate, the higher the level of secrecy.
A rate-equivocation triple (R0, R1, R1,e) is achievable if
there exists a sequence of
(
2nR0 , 2nR1 , n
)
codes with the
average error probability P (n)e → 0 as n goes to infinity and
with the equivocation rate R1,e satisfying
R1,e ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0). (3)
The rate-equivocation triple (R0, R1, R1,e) indicates that the
rate pair (R0, R1) can be achieved at the secrecy level R1,e .
The capacity-equivocation region, denoted by C , is the clo-
sure of the set that consists of all achievable rate-equivocation
triples (R0, R1, R1,e).
We are interested in the case where perfect secrecy is
achieved, i.e., user 2 does not get any information about the
confidential message that user 1 sends to the destination. This
happens if Re = R1.
Definition 4: The secrecy capacity region Cs is the region
that includes all achievable rate pairs (R0, R1) such that Re =
R1, i.e.,
Cs = {(R0, R1) : (R0, R1, R1) ∈ C }. (4)
Definition 5: For a given rate R0, the secrecy capacity is
the maximum achievable rate R1 with the confidential message
perfectly hidden from user 2, i.e.,
Cs(R0) = max
(R0,R1)∈Cs
R1. (5)
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Fig. 2. A deterministic GMAC model
For the GMAC with one confidential message set, inner and
outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region were given
in [4]. In particular, the exact secrecy capacity region was es-
tablished. For the degraded GMAC, the capacity-equivocation
region was established, which is given in the following lemma.
This lemma is useful to study binary and Gaussian GMACs.
Lemma 1: ([4]) For the degraded GMAC with one con-
fidential message set as in Definition 2, the capacity-
equivocation region is given by
C
d =
⋃
p(q, x2)p(x1|q)
p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2)

(R0, R1, Re) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Q),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Q)− I(X1;Y2|X2, Q),
R0 +Re ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1;Y2|X2, Q)


.
(6)
where Q is bounded in cardinality by |Q| ≤ |X1| · |X2|+ 1.
III. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
In this section, we consider a deterministic discrete mem-
oryless GMAC model with one confidential message set.
We obtain the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy
capacity region for this channel.
Consider a binary channel with all channel inputs and
outputs having alphabets {0, 1}. The MAC from the two
users to the destination is a binary multiplier channel, and the
channel from user 1 to user 2 is a bias channel. The channel
input-output relationship (see Fig. 2) is given by
Y = X1 ·X2, Y2 =
{
1, if X1 ≤ X2;
0, if X1 > X2.
(7)
The capacity-equivocation region of the example channel
given in (7) is:
{(R0, R1, Re) : R0 +R1 ≤ 1, Re = R1}. (8)
The capacity-equivocation region implies that the secrecy
capacity region of this channel is:
{(R0, R1) : R0 +R1 ≤ 1}. (9)
2
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Fig. 3. Secrecy capacity region of a deterministic GMAC
Note that the region (9) (see Fig. 3) coincides with the capacity
region of the binary multiplier MAC given in [7].
To show that perfect secrecy can be achieved for all points
in the region (9), we first show that perfect secrecy can be
achieved for the two corner points. It is trivial that perfect
secrecy can be achieved for the corner point (R0 = 1, R1 =
0), i.e., Re = 0 is achievable at this point. For the other
corner point (R0 = 0, R1 = 1), perfect secrecy is achieved by
sending (x1 = 0, x2 = 1) for W1 = 0 and (x1 = 1, x2 = 1)
for W1 = 1. When either of these two codewords is trans-
mitted, user 2 always gets output Y2 = 1, and hence cannot
determine whether W1 = 0 or W1 = 1 is sent. Therefore,
perfect secrecy is achieved. By time-sharing between these
two corner points, perfect secrecy can be achieved for the
entire region. Note that since the region (8) is the best possible
rate-equivocation region that can be achieved, it is hence the
capacity-equivocation region (8).
Remark 1: The deterministic GMAC defined in (7) is
a nondegraded channel. We hence obtain the capacity-
equivocation region for a nondegraded channel.
IV. THE BINARY GMAC WITH ONE CONFIDENTIAL
MESSAGE SET
In this section, we first follow [8] to introduce notation
and useful lemmas for binary channels. We then introduce
the binary GMAC model we study and present the capacity-
equivocation region for this channel.
We first define the following operation:
a ∗ b := a(1 − b) + (1− a)b for 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1. (10)
We then define the following entropy function
h(a) :=
{
−a log a− (1− a) log(1− a), if 0 < a < 1;
0, if a = 0 or 1.
(11)
Note that the function h(a) is one-to-one for 0 ≤ a ≤ 1/2. The
inverse of the entropy function is limited to h−1(c) ∈ [0, 1/2].
Lemma 2: ([8]) The function f(u) = h(ρ ∗ h−1(u)), 0 ≤
u ≤ 1 (where ρ ∈ (0, 1/2] is a fixed parameter) is strictly
convex in u.
The following useful lemma is a binary version of the
entropy power inequality.
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Fig. 4. A degraded binary example GMAC
Lemma 3: ([8]) Consider two binary random vectors Xn
and Y n. Let H(Xn) ≥ nv. Let
Yi = Xi ⊕ Zi for i = 1, . . . , n (12)
where Zn is a binary random vector with i.i.d. components and
Zi has distribution Pr(Zi = 1) = p0 where 0 < p0 ≤ 1/2.
The vectors Xn and Y n can be viewed as inputs and outputs
of a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with the crossover
probability p0. Then,
H(Y n) ≥ nh(p0 ∗ h−1(v)) (13)
with equality if and only if Xn has independent components,
and H(Xi) = v for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
We now consider a discrete memoryless binary GMAC
model with all inputs and outputs having the binary alphabet
set {0, 1}. The channel input-output relationship (see Fig. 4)
at each time instant satisfies
Yi = X1,i ·X2,i, Y2,i = Yi⊕Z2,i for i = 1, . . . , n (14)
where Zn2 is a binary random vector with i.i.d. components
and Z2,i has distribution Pr(Z2,i = 1) = p where 0 < p ≤
1/2. Note that the MAC channel from (X1, X2) to Y is a
binary multiplier channel. It is clear that this GMAC channel
is degraded, and the channel outputs Y and Y2 can be viewed
as the input and output of a discrete memoryless BSC with
the crossover probability p.
We have the following theorem on the capacity-equivocation
region.
Theorem 1: For the binary GMAC with one confidential
message set defined in (14), the capacity-equivocation region
is
C
B =
⋃
0≤α≤ 1
2


(R0, R1, Re) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ h(α),
R0 +R1 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ h(α) + h(p)− h(p ∗ α),
R0 +Re ≤ 1 + h(p)− h(p ∗ α)


. (15)
The proof of Theorem 1 is given at the end of this section.
Corollary 1: The secrecy capacity region of the binary
GMAC with one confidential message set defined in (14) is
CBs =
⋃
0≤α≤ 1
2


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ h(α) + h(p)− h(p ∗ α),
R0 +R1 ≤ 1 + h(p)− h(p ∗ α)

 . (16)
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Fig. 5. Secrecy capacity regions of the binary GMAC with one confidential
message set
The secrecy capacity as a function of R0 is given by
CBs (R0) = h(α
∗) + h(p)− h(p ∗ α∗) (17)
where α∗ is determined by the following equation
R0 = 1− h(α∗). (18)
Remark 2: The BSC crossover probability parameter p
determines how noisy the channel from user 1 to user 2
is compared to the channel from user 1 to the destination.
When p = 0, user 2 has the same channel from user 1 as
the destination, and hence no secrecy can be achieved. As
p increases, user 2 has a noisier channel from user 1 than
the destination, and hence higher secrecy can be achieved. As
p = 12 , user 2 is totally confused by confidential messages
sent by user 1, and perfect secrecy is achieved.
Fig. 5 plots the secrecy capacity as a function of R0 for four
values of p. These lines of CBs (R0) also serves as boundaries
of the secrecy capacity regions with the vertical axis being
viewed as R1. It is clear from Fig. 5 that as p increases,
the secrecy capacity region enlarges, because user 2 is further
confused about the confidential message sent by user 1.
Remark 3: From the achievability proof of Theorem 1
(given at the end of this section), it can be seen that the
optimal scheme to achieve the secrecy capacity region uses
superposition encoding. To achieve the secrecy capacity cor-
responding to different values of R0, different values of the
superposition parameter α needs to be chosen to generate the
codebook. However, if the secrecy constraint is not considered,
the capacity region of the binary multiplier MAC can be
achieved by a time sharing scheme and superposition encoding
is not necessary.
Fig. 6 plots the secrecy capacity as a function of R0
(indicated by the solid line) and compares it with the secrecy
rate achieved by the time sharing scheme (indicated by the
dashed line). The figure demonstrates that the time sharing
scheme is strictly suboptimal to provide the secrecy capacity
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Fig. 6. Comparison of secrecy capacity region and secrecy rate region
achieved by time sharing scheme for the binary GMAC with one confidential
message set
region. As we commented in Remark 3, although the time
sharing scheme is optimal to achieve the capacity region of
the binary multiplier MAC, it is not optimal to achieve the
secrecy capacity region of the binary GMAC, where secrecy
is also considered as a performance criterion.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Achievability:
We apply Lemma 1 to prove that the region (15) is achiev-
able. Let Q and X ′ be two binary random variables with
alphabet {0, 1}, and assume that Q is independent of X ′. We
choose the following joint distribution:
Pr{Q = 0} = 1
2
; Pr{X ′ = 1} = α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
;
Pr{X2 = 1} = 1; X1 = Q⊕X ′.
We now compute the mutual information terms in (6) given
in Lemma 1 based on the preceding joint distribution.
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Q) = H(Y |X2, Q)
= Pr{Q = 0}H(Y |X2 = 1, Q = 0)
+ Pr{Q = 1}H(Y |X2 = 1, Q = 1)
= h(α),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ) = H(Y ) = 1,
Re ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Q)− I(X1;Y2|X2, Q)
= h(α)− (H(Y2|X2, Q)−H(Y2|X1, X2))
= h(α)− [Pr{Q = 0}H(Y2|X2 = 1, Q = 0)
+ Pr{Q = 1}H(Y2|X2 = 1, Q = 1)
− Pr{X1 = 0}H(Y2|X2 = 1, X1 = 0)
− Pr{X1 = 1}H(Y2|X2 = 1, X1 = 1)
]
= h(α)− [h(α ∗ p)− h(p)]
= h(α) + h(p)− h(α ∗ p),
4
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1;Y2|X2, Q)
= 1− [h(α ∗ p)− h(p)]
= 1 + h(p)− h(α ∗ p).
Proof of the Converse:
We consider a sequence of
(
2nR0 , 2nR1 , n
)
codes for the
degraded GMAC with one confidential message set with
P
(n)
e → 0. Then the probability distribution on W0 ×W1 ×
Xn1 ×Xn2 × Yn × Yn2 is given by
p(w0, w1, x
n
1 , x
n
2 , y
n, yn2 )
= p(w0)p(w1)p(x
n
1 |w0, w1)p(xn2 |w0)
n∏
i=1
p(yi, y2,i|x1,i, x2,i)
From [9, Sec. 4.2], we have the following bounds:
nR1,e
≤ I(Xn1 ;Y n|Xn2 ,W0)− I(Xn1 ;Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i;Yi|Qi, X2,i)− I(X1,i;Y2,i|Qi, X2,i) + nδn
(19)
where Qi := (Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0), and δn → 0 if P (n)e → 0.
nR0 + nR1,e
≤ I(W0;Y n) + nR1,e + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i, X2,i;Yi)− I(X1,i;Y2,i|Qi, X2,i) + nδn
(20)
nR1 ≤ I(Xn1 ;Y n|W0, Xn2 ) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i;Yi|X2,i, Qi) + nδn (21)
nR0 + nR1 ≤ I(W0,W1;Y n) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i, X2,i;Yi) + nδn.
(22)
We now further derive the bounds (19)-(22) for the binary
GMAC. From (21), we obtain
nR1 ≤ I(Xn1 ;Y n|Xn2 ,W0) + nδn = H(Y n|Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(23)
where we have used the deterministic property of the GMAC,
which implies H(Y n|Xn1 , Xn2 ,W0) = 0.
Since {Yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} are binary random variables,
H(Yi) ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence
0 ≤ H(Y n|Xn2 ,W0) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi) ≤ n. (24)
It is clear that there exists a parameter α ∈ [0, 1/2] such that
H(Y n|Xn2 ,W0) = nh(α). (25)
Substituting the preceding equation into (23), we obtain
nR1 ≤ nh(α) + nδn. (26)
From (22), we obtain
nR0 + nR1 ≤ I(W0,W1;Y n) + nδn ≤ H(Y n) + nδn
≤ n+ nδn.
(27)
From (19), we obtain
nR1,e
≤ I(Xn1 ;Y n|Xn2 ,W0)− I(Xn1 ;Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
= H(Y n|Xn2 ,W0)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0)
+H(Y n2 |Xn1 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(a)
= nh(α)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0)
+H(Y n2 |Y n, Xn1 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(b)
= nh(α)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) +H(Y n2 |Y n) + nδn
= nh(α)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nh(p) + nδn
(28)
In the preceding bound, the first term in (a) follows from
(25), the third term in (a) follows from the fact that Y n is a
deterministic function of (Xn1 , Xn2 ), and the third term in (b)
follows from the fact that Y n2 is conditionally independent of
everything else given Y n.
Since Zn2 in (14) is independent of W0, Xn2 and Y n, we
apply Lemma 3 to bound the term H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0).
H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0)
= EH(Y n2 |Xn2 = xn2 ,W0 = w0)
(a)
≥ E
[
nh
(
p ∗ h−1
(
H(Y n|Xn2 = xn2 ,W0 = w0)
n
))]
(b)
≥ nh
(
p ∗ h−1
(
E
H(Y n|Xn2 = xn2 ,W0 = w0)
n
))
= nh
(
p ∗ h−1
(
H(Y n|Xn2 ,W0)
n
))
(c)
= nh
(
p ∗ h−1
(
nh(α)
n
))
= nh(p ∗ α)
(29)
where (a) follows from Lemma 3, (b) follows from Lemma
2 and Jensen’s inequality, and (c) follows from (25).
Substituting (29) into (28), we obtain
nR1,e ≤ nh(α) + nh(p)− nh(p ∗ α) + nδn. (30)
From (20), we obtain
nR0 + nR1,e
≤ I(W0;Y n) + nR1,e
(a)
≤ I(W0;Y n) + I(Xn1 ;Y n|Xn2 ,W0)
− I(Xn1 ;Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(b)
≤ I(W0, Xn2 ;Y n) + I(Xn1 ;Y n|Xn2 ,W0)
− I(Xn1 ;Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
= I(W0, X
n
1 , X
n
2 ;Y
n)− I(Xn1 ;Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
= H(Y n)− I(Xn1 ;Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(c)
≤ n+ nh(p)− nh(p ∗ α) + nδn
(31)
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where (a) follows from (19), (b) follows from the chain rule
and nonnegativity of mutual information, and (c) follows from
the steps in deriving R1,e.
In summary, (26), (27), (30) and (31) constitute the converse
proof for Theorem 1.
V. GAUSSIAN GMAC WITH ONE CONFIDENTIAL
MESSAGE SET
In this section, we study the Gaussian GMAC with one
confidential message set, where the channel outputs at the
destination and user 2 are corrupted by additive Gaussian noise
terms. We assume that the channel is discrete and memoryless,
and that the channel input-output relationship at each time
instant is given by
Yi = X1,i +X2,i + Zi
Y2,i = X1,i +X2,i + Z2,i
(32)
where Zn and Zn2 are independent zero mean Gaussian
random vectors with i.i.d. components. We assume that Zi and
Z2,i have variances N and N2, respectively, where N < N2.
The channel input sequences Xn1 and Xn2 are subject to the
average power constraints P1 and P2, respectively, i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
X21,i ≤ P1, and
1
n
n∑
i=1
X22,i ≤ P2. (33)
The following theorem states the capacity-equivocation re-
gion for the Gaussian GMAC with one confidential message
set.
Theorem 2: For the Gaussian GMAC with one confidential
message set given in (32), the capacity-equivocation region is
given by
C
G =
⋃
0≤α≤1


(R0, R1, Re) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ 12 log
(
1 + αP1
N
)
,
R0 +R1 ≤ 12 log
(
1 + P1+P2+2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
,
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ 12 log
(
1 + αP1
N
)− 12 log(1 + αP1N2
)
,
R0 +Re ≤ 12 log
(
1 + P1+P2+2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
− 12 log
(
1 + αP1
N2
)


.
(34)
where α¯ = 1−α indicating the correlation between the inputs
from users 1 and 2.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given at the end of this section.
Corollary 2: The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian
GMAC with one confidential message set given in (32) is
CGs =
⋃
0≤α≤1


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ 12 log
(
1 + αP1
N
)− 12 log (1 + αP1N2
)
,
R0 +R1 ≤ 12 log
(
1 + P1+P2+2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
− 12 log
(
1 + αP1
N2
)


.
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Fig. 7. Secrecy capacity regions of Gaussian GMACs with one confidential
message set and capacity region of corresponding Gaussian MAC
The secrecy capacity as a function of R0 is
CGs (R0) =


1
2 log
(
1 + P1
N
)− 12 log(1 + P1N2
)
,
if R0 ≤ 12 log P1+P2+NP1+N
1
2 log
(
1 + α
∗P1
N
)
− 12 log
(
1 + α
∗P1
N2
)
if R0 > 12 log
P1+P2+N
P1+N
(36)
where α∗ is determined by the following equation
R0 =
1
2
log
P1 + P2 + 2
√
(1 − α∗)P1P2 +N
α∗P1 +N
. (37)
Fig. 7 plots the secrecy capacity CGs (R0) (solid lines) of
Gaussian GMACs with one confidential message set for three
user 1-to-user 2 SNR values. The lines of CGs (R0) also serve
as boundaries of the secrecy capacity regions if we view the
vertical axis as R1. It can be seen that as user 1-to-user 2
SNR decreases, which implies that the noise level at user 2
increases, user 2 gets more confused about the confidential
message sent by user 1. Thus the secrecy capacity region
enlarges. As this SNR approaches zero, the secrecy capacity
region approaches the entire capacity region of the Gaussian
MAC, which means that perfect secrecy is achieved for almost
all points in the capacity region of the MAC.
Proof of Theorem 2
We first note the following useful lemma.
Lemma 4: ([4]) The capacity-equivocation region of
GMACs with one confidential message set depends only
on the marginal channel transition probability distributions
p(y|x1, x2) and p(y2|x1, x2).
To show Theorem 2, we first note that the Gaussian GMAC
defined in (32) is not physically degraded according to Def-
inition 2. However, it has the same marginal distributions
p(y|x1, x2) and p(y2|x1, x2) as the following physically de-
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graded Gaussian GMAC:
Yi = X1,i +X2,i + Zi
Y2,i = X1,i +X2,i + Zi + Z
′
i
(38)
where Zn is the same as in (32). The random vector Z ′n
is independent of Zn, and has i.i.d. components with each
component having the distribution N (0, N2 −N). According
to Lemma 4, it is sufficient to prove Theorem 2 for the
physically degraded Gaussian GMAC defined in (38).
Proof of the Achievability:
The achievability follows by computing the mutual informa-
tion terms in Lemma 1 with the following joint distribution:
Q = φ, X2 ∼ N (0, P2)
X ′1 ∼ N (0, αP1), and X ′1 is independent of X2
X1 =
√
α¯P1
P2
X2 +X
′
1
(39)
Proof of the Converse:
We apply the bounds (19)-(22), and further derive these
bounds for the degraded Gaussian GMAC.
From (21), we obtain
nR1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i;Yi|X2,i, Qi) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi)− h(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Qi) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi)− h(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Qi) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi)− 1
2
log 2pieN + nδn
(40)
For the first term in the preceding inequality, we have
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi)
=
n∑
i=1
h(X1,i +X2,i + Zi|X2,i, Qi)
=
n∑
i=1
h(X1,i + Zi|X2,i, Qi)
≤
n∑
i=1
h(X1,i + Zi) ≤
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2pie(EX21,i +N)
(a)
≤ n
2
log 2pie
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
EX21,i +N
)
≤ n
2
log 2pie(P1 +N)
(41)
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality.
On the other hand,
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi)
≥
n∑
i=1
h(X1,i +X2,i + Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Qi)
=
n
2
log 2pieN .
(42)
Combining (41) and (42), we establish that there exists some
α ∈ [0, 1] such that
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi) = n
2
log 2pie(αP1 +N) . (43)
We hence obtain the bound for R1
nR1 ≤ n
2
log 2pie(αP1 +N)− 1
2
log 2pieN + nδn
=
n
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N
)
+ nδn .
(44)
For the term
∑n
i=1 h(Yi|X2,i, Qi), we can also derive the
following bound:
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi)
=
n∑
i=1
h(X1,i + Zi|X2,i, Qi)
≤
n∑
i=1
EX2,i,Qi
1
2
log 2pieVar(X1,i + Zi|X2,i, Qi)
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2pieEX2,i,QiVar(X1,i + Zi|X2,i, Qi)
=
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2pie
(
EX2,i,QiVar(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
)
=
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2pie
(
E(X21,i)− EX2,i,QiE2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
)
(b)
≤ n
2
log 2pie
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
E(X21,i)
− 1
n
EX2,i,QiE
2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
)
≤ n
2
log 2pie
(
P1 − 1
n
EX2,i,QiE
2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
)
(45)
where (a) and (b) follows from Jensen’s inequality.
Using (43), we have
αP1 +N ≤ P1 − 1
n
EX2,i,QiE
2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
=⇒ 1
n
EX2,i,QiE
2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) ≤ α¯P1
(46)
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From (22), we obtain
nR0 + nR1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i, X2,i;Yi) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
h(Yi)− I(Yi|X1,i, X2,i) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
h(Yi)− n
2
log 2pieN + nδn
(47)
For the first term in the preceding inequality, we obtain
n∑
i=1
h(Yi)
=
n∑
i=1
h(Xi +X1,i + Zi)
≤
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2pie
(
E(X1,i +X2,i)
2 +N
)
(a)
≤ n
2
log 2pie
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
E(X1,i +X2,i)
2 +N
)
≤ n
2
log 2pie
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
EX21,i
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
EX22,i +
1
n
n∑
i=1
2E(X1,iX2,i) +N
)
≤ n
2
log 2pie
(
P1 + P2 +
1
n
n∑
i=1
2E(X1,iX2,i) +N
)
≤ n
2
log 2pie
(
P1 + P2
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
2E
(
X2,iE(X1,i|X2,i, Qi)
)
+N
)
(b)
≤ n
2
log 2pie
(
P1 + P2
+
2
n
n∑
i=1
√
EX22,i · EE2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
)
(c)
≤ n
2
log 2pie
(
P1 + P2
+ 2
√√√√( 1
n
n∑
i=1
EX22,i
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
EE2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi)
)
+N
)
(d)
≤ n
2
log 2pie
(
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2 +N
)
(48)
In the preceding bound, (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality,
(b) and (c) follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and (d)
follows from (46).
Hence,
nR0 + nR1
≤ n
2
log 2pie
(
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2 +N
)
− n
2
log 2pieN + nδn
=
n
2
log
(
1 +
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
+ nδn
(49)
From (19), we obtain
nR1,e
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i;Yi|X2,i, Qi)− I(X1,i;Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) + nδn
=
n
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N
)
−
n∑
i=1
h(Y2,i|X2,i, Qi)
+
n
2
log 2pieN2 + nδn
(50)
To bound the term
∑n
i=1 h(Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) in (50), we first
derive the following bound. Since Z ′i is independent of Yi
given X2,i and Qi, by entropy power inequality, we obtain
22h(Yi+Z
′
i|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi)
≥ 22h(Yi|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi) + 22h(Z′i|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi)
= 22h(Yi|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi) + 2pie(N2 −N)
We then obtain
h(Yi + Z
′
i|X2,i = x2,i, Qi = qi)
≥ 1
2
log
(
22h(Yi|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi) + 2pie(N2 −N)
)
Taking the expectation on both sides of the preceding equation,
we obtain
Eh(Yi + Z
′
i|X2,i = x2,i, Qi = qi)
≥ 1
2
E log
(
22h(Yi|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi) + 2pie(N2 −N)
)
(a)
≥ 1
2
log
(
22Eh(Yi|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi) + 2pie(N2 −N)
)
=
1
2
log
(
22h(Yi|X2,i,Qi) + 2pie(N2 −N)
)
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality and the fact that
log(2x + c) is a convex function.
Summing over the index i, the preceding inequality becomes
n∑
i=1
h(Yi + Z
′
i|X2,i, Qi)
≥ 1
2
n∑
i=1
log
(
22h(Yi|X2,i,Qi) + 2pie(N2 −N)
)
(a)
≥ n
2
log
(
22
1
n
P
n
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i,Qi) + 2pie(N2 −N)
)
(b)
=
n
2
log (2pie(αP1 +N) + 2pie(N2 −N))
=
n
2
log (2pie(αP1 +N2))
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where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality, and (b) follows
from (46).
Applying the preceding bound to the term∑n
i=1 h(Y2,i|X2,i, Qi), we obtain
n∑
i=1
h(Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) =
n∑
i=1
h(Yi + Z
′
i|X2,i, Qi)
≥ n
2
log (2pie(αP1 +N2))
(51)
Substituting the preceding bound into (50), we obtain
nR1,e ≤ n
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N
)
− n
2
log (2pie(αP1 +N2)) +
n
2
log 2pieN2 + nδn
≤ n
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N
)
− n
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N2
)
+ nδn
(52)
From (20), we obtain
nR0 + nR1,e
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i, X2,i;Yi)− I(X1,i;Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) + nδn
≤ n
2
log
(
1 +
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
−
n∑
i=1
h(Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) + n
2
log 2pieN2 + nδn
≤ n
2
log
(
1 +
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
− n
2
log (2pie(αP1 +N2)) +
n
2
log 2pieN2 + nδn
≤ n
2
log
(
1 +
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
− n
2
log(1 +
αP1
N2
) + nδn,
(53)
which completes the proof.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have established the capacity-equivocation region for a
binary example GMAC and the Gaussian GMAC with one
confidential message set. For the binary GMAC, we have
shown that the time-sharing scheme is strictly suboptimal to
achieve the secrecy capacity, although it is optimal to achieve
the capacity without the secrecy constraint. We have also
found that the capacity-equivocation region of GMACs with
one confidential message set depends only on the marginal
channels p(y|x1, x2) and p(y2|x1, x2). Based on this observa-
tion, we have obtained the capacity-equivocation region for the
Gaussian GMAC (not necessarily physically degraded) with
one confidential message set.
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